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Demographic Effects on Personal Saving 
in the Future 
Frederic L. Pryor* 
After briefly examining the various proposed causes for the decline in the U.S. personal saving rate in 
the past decade, this essay then argues that a shift in the demographic composition of the population 
will be a much more important cause for a decline in personal saving in the future. A change in the 
balance between those in the labor force who are saving and retirees who are dissaving will result in 
a considerable fall in the aggregate saving rate under most assumptions. The simulation model used to 
examine this phenomenon takes into account he interest rate, the growth rate of the economy, the 
retirement age, the growth of population, and the life expectancy. Attention is also given to certain 
consequences of the fall in the saving rate, such as changes in the interest rate, changes in asset prices, 
and a decline in the GDP growth rate. 
1. Introduction 
Analyses of the long-term growth of the U.S. economy generally focus primary attention on the 
rate of technological change. It is generally assumed that saving to finance the necessary investment 
will not be a problem. In this essay, I use a simulation model incorporating a lifetime income ap- 
proach toward saving to argue that this assumption is wrong. More specifically, I show that in the long 
run, personal saving will decline as a shift in the demographic balance between savers (those in the 
working ages) and dissavers (retired workers), and, as a result, economic growth will taper off, 
especially since it seems unlikely that the decline in personal saving will be offset by increases either 
in business or government saving or in greater capital inflows from abroad. 
The argument proceeds in three steps. The two building blocks of the argument are the behavior of 
personal saving and the age structure of the population, which are discussed in section 2. In section 3, I 
present a simulation model to provide some idea about the magnitudes of the changes involved in the 
saving rate when the age structure of the population shifts. In section 4, I explore several variations of 
the model and, in section 5, some of the most important implications of the predicted changes in saving. 
2. Setting the Stage 
The Saving Rate 
According to the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), which measure saving as 
a flow of resources, the annual rate of personal saving (excluding expenditures for consumer durables) 
as a percentage of GDP followed an inverted U-shape pattern, rising from 5.2% in the 1950s to 6.7% 
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in the 1980s before falling to 4.6% in the 1990s.' Business saving as a percentage of GDP rose about 
2 percentage points between the 1950s and the 1970s and subsequently leveled off for the rest of the 
century so that it did not offset he fall in personal saving in the 1990s. The flow of funds data from 
the Federal Reserve reveal similar trends from the 1950s through the 1980s and a more dramatic fall 
in the last decade of the century. 
Such a picture of the saving rate becomes muddied if we measure saving in terms of changes in 
personal net worth (stock data). By this yardstick, the ratio of saving to the GDP did not change 
between the 1980s and the 1990s. Such results seem primarily due to a rise in asset prices and the 
resulting capital gains rather than any activity giving rise to growth in real investment. I return to this 
phenomenon in section 4. 
For economic growth, the crucial fact is that, as a share of GDP, domestically financed 
investment remained roughly constant from the 1950s through the 1980s and then fell 2 percentage 
points in the 1990s, a circumstance giving rise to concern about the fall of domestic saving. As 
a result, many economists have focused considerable attention on the causes underlying this short- 
term fall in the saving rate during the 1990s (when saving is defined in terms of flow data) and 
whether this phenomenon will become more serious in the future. 
VVarious arguments are offered to explain the changes observed in the flow of saving during the 
1990s. Some, such as Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991) and Parker (1999), argue that it can be 
traced to a fall in the saving rate at all age-groups.2 Others, such as Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus 
(1996), provide contrary evidence that the fall came from a redistribution fincome from the young to 
the old and a decline in the saving rate of the elderly due to a fall in the need for saving both for bequest 
purposes and for precautionary purposes.3 Still others stress the fact that since most saving in the 
United States in recent years has been through unrealized capital gains, much of the lower saving 
measured in more traditional ways is due to a wealth effect, a hypothesis that is hotly disputed.4 
These data are drawn from the revised GDP accounts from the official NIPA data that come from U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1998), and Web site (http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dnl.htm), tables 5.1 and 5.2. The 
data from the flow of funds data come from the Web site of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/current/zlr-3.pdf), table F.9. The stock data are compiled from balance sheet information 
from table B.100. Gale and Sabelhaus (1999) have an excellent analysis of the various problems in defining and measuring 
saving and the trends according to various definitions. 
2 Using SIPP (Survey of Income and Program Participation) data, Venti and Wise (1996, p. 29) argue the reverse, namely, that in 
recent years personal saving has increased, particularly as a result of government tax measures to encourage saving for 
retirement. Ifcurrent rends continue, they claim that "the baby boom generation will accumulate substantially larger levels of 
personal financial assets than their older counterparts and thus after retirement will have much larger pools of accessible assets 
upon which to draw to meet unexpected contingencies." Their use of disposable income as the denominator of the calculations 
raises problems since it refers only to a rather arbitrary definition of money income and, moreover, does not include all sources 
of income such as claims on future pensions. This can be circumvented by using asset data, an approach followed by Gokhale, 
Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus (1996). 
3 Saving for precautionary purposes has declined because of the expansion of various types of government insurance programs 
(disability insurance, unemployment insurance, various types of emergency welfare programs, and so on) to help families 
reduce risk. Moreover, the rising share of wealth held in annuities such as Social Security and private pensions eliminates the 
precautionary savings needed to prevent outliving one's assets. The savings need for bequest purposes has also declined 
because of the deterioration in family solidarity, as shown by the declining share of the elderly living with their children and the 
rising fraction of marriages ending in divorce. 4 Parker (1999) presents evidence that the wealth effect accounts for no more than 20% of the rise of the consumption rate (which, 
of course, is mirrored by the fall in saving). I argue here, however, that the wealth effect may become considerably more important 
in the future. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1990) provide evidence that certain other factors, such as increased government 
consumption to the net national product (NNP) in the 1980s, large government deficits in the 1980s, saving disincentives, and the 
behavior of stock prices, can explain only a very small fraction of the change in the saving rate. They also dismiss another set of 
hypothesized causes, such as business cycle conditions, changes in income equality, and an increase in female labor force 
participation. 
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Table 1. Estimates of Future Population Growth and Elderly Dependency Ratios 
Average Annual lAverage ual Elderly Dependency Ratios, 1960, 1980, and 1995 
Population Growth, 
Actual data 1995-2050 17.7% 19.9% 21.9% 
Forecasts 2010 2030 2050 
Census Bureau 
Low population growth 0.13% 21.8% 36.3% 35.2% 
Medium population growth 0.74 22.3 37.6 37.9 
High population growth 1.24 22.7 38.3 39.9 
Social Security Administration 
High Social Security cost 0.42 21.8 38.3 44.6 
Medium Social Security cost 0.59 21.4 35.4 37.0 
Low Social Security cost 0.80 20.8 32.5 30.9 
Lee and Tuljapurkar (low and high estimates define the 95% confidence limit) 
Low population growth 0.03 22.3 40.9 51.5 
Median population growth 0.63 22.3 36.4 39.1 
High population growth 1.23 22.6 33.1 30.6 
Note: The elderly dependency ratio is the ratio of the population over 64 to those in the working ages from 20 through 64. 
Census Bureau estimates come from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1996). For the low and high 
estimates, I had to make several minor adjustments; nevertheless, these estimates do not affect the unexpected results that the 
elderly dependency ratios have a direct rather than inverse relation to the population growth rate. The Social Security 
Administration estimates come from the U.S. Social Security Administration (1999, table II-H-1). The Lee and Tuljalpukar 
(1994) estimates come from their table 2. I estimate the elderly dependency ratio from their population estimates, rather than their 
direct estimates of this ratio, to achieve consistency with the other calculations in this essay. Their stochastically estimated 
dependency ratios are slightly different because of the lognormal distribution they used in their estimates. A more lucid 
explanation of their stochastic estimating procedures than in their original article can be found in Lee and Tuljalpukar (1998). For 
none of these estimates are the assumptions about immigration specified in much detail, although immigration may well be the 
crucial determinant of future U.S. population growth. 
While these various microeconomic effects may be important in the short run, I show in the 
simulation analysis here that some much more important long-term changes due to shifts in the age 
structure of the population will take place, and these will prove to have a more lasting impact. 
Demographic Changes 
A major part of the model deals with the changing age structure of the population and the ratio 
between retired to active workers. For analysis of the age structure, one key concept is the elderly 
dependency ratio, which is the ratio of the elderly (those over 64) to those in the working ages. Table 
1 presents not just the estimates by the Census Bureau and the Social Security Administration but also 
some much more sophisticated estimates by Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994; hereafter L-T), who use 
probabilistic methods to take into account uncertainties about birth and death rates. 
From these three sets of estimates, we can draw two simple conclusions. First, the nation is likely 
to face a dramatic rise in the elderly dependency ratio in the next half century. Second, the range of 
these estimated ratios is very large. For instance, the L-T calculations give a 95% probability that in 
2050 the dependency ratio will fall somewhere between 30.6% and 51.5%. If uncertainties about the 
future of immigration policies are taken more adequately into account, the range of these estimates 
would undoubtedly be larger. 
The next step is to consider the ratio of retired to active workers. This ratio depends, of course, 
not just on the elderly dependency ratio but also on the age of retirement, a phenomenon requiring us 
to take into account two sets of circumstances: 
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(i) Life expectancy is increasing. In 2000, a 65-year-old person could expect to live 15 more 
years; by 2050, this will be closer to 20 years. Moreover, because of advances in medicine, the young- 
old (i.e., those between 65 and 75) are healthier than a generation ago. 
(ii) From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, the percentage of men from 60 to 69 in the labor force 
declined (Quinn 1999). Since then, however, this percentage has leveled off. For women in the same 
age cohort and in the same period, the pattern was more irregular. In general, however, the percentage 
in the labor force remained roughly the same until the mid-1980s, when it began to increase. In the 
1990s, many of those who would have retired were either taking bridge jobs or postponing retirement. 
A variety of factors underlay these changes, including changing health status, evolving patterns of 
home ownership and pension availability, and changes in mandatory retirement laws, Social Security 
payments to the working elderly, and the degree to which inflation eroded savings. 
In looking at the future of saving, these demographic considerations have two important 
implications. First, it is necessary to take into account both the rising life expectancy and the possible 
postponement of retirement. Second, if the customary retirement remains the same, future cohorts will 
have to have a higher annual saving rate to finance the longer retirement period brought about by the 
longer life span. If, by way of contrast, future cohorts shift heir retirement age so that the length of 
retirement remains the same, then they will need a lower annual saving rate because they will be able 
to spread accumulation of a given amount of retirement funds over a longer lifetime. 
3. The Impact of Aging on Saving 
The analysis focuses on aggregate net saving, that is, the result of gross saving by active workers 
and gross dissaving by retired workers. I begin the analysis with some highly unrealistic assumptions 
about the hyperrationality of savers and then relax them after the mechanics of the model are clear. 
The Model 
For individuals, I start by assuming complete foresight and a lifetime income approach toward 
saving. With full knowledge of how their incomes will change up to their retirement, workers decide 
on their saving and consumption rate each year to achieve three goals: to maintain a constant level of 
consumption over their working lifetime, to have enough savings during their retirement to finance 
some selected fraction of this consumption each year thereafter, and to exhaust their savings in their 
final year. The future growth and interest rates of the economy are constant, which individuals know 
when making their saving decisions.5 All workers are assumed to have the same annual income so 
that the results of the calculations for one worker can be easily aggregated for the entire working 
population.6 The initial model also assumes an equilibrium situation, with the only shocks coming 
from the changing age structure, the changing life expectancy, and the changing retirement age that 
are introduced by the simulator. This simple approach allows the implications of the basic mechanism 
5 I argue in section 5 that growth will actually fall and that interest rates will rise. Although the model can be complicated to take 
these changing parameters into account in the optimization procedures for determining saving, the results are simpler to 
interpret when a ceteris paribus approach is used. The reader can interpret the growth and interest rates used in the model as 
"average" rates if the changes in these parameters are considered important. 
6 The income pattern of the average worker incomes actually rises for several decades before leveling off. Taking this 
phenomenon into account has only a minuscule effect on the simulation results while enormously complicating the 
calculations. In the form presented in this essay, the simulations can be carried out on a spreadsheet program. 
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to be understood and the results to be presented in a systematic and quantitative fashion before 
complications are introduced. 
Each year, the L-T population estimates are divided between workers and retirees. Active 
workers include all those from 25 up to the age of retirement, and retired workers are all those over the 
preselected retirement age.7 Of course, in the real world only a fraction of those between 25 and 65 
participate in the labor force, and the number of retirees must be multiplied by a similar fraction to 
determine the number of retired workers. It should, however, be clear (and the simulation results 
confirm this intuition) that the chosen participation ratio has no impact on the simulation results about 
changes in the net saving rate.8 
Workers are assumed to have labor income increasing at a fixed percentage each year for their 
working lifetime, which takes into account higher labor productivity due to technical change and 
capital accumulation. With a full knowledge of how their incomes will change up to their retirement, 
they save (or dissave) so as to have the same consumption every year of their working lifetime and, 
after retirement, o have enough savings to allow them a certain fraction of this consumption during 
their years of retirement (the consumption replacement ratio). 
Once savers know the future growth and interest rates, they simultaneously decide their 
consumption replacement ratio and their saving pattern during their working life. If one of these is 
known, the other can be easily determined. In the lifetime income approach used in this discussion, 
both decisions depend on the degree to which savers discount their consumption during retirement. 
Nevertheless, as I show here, looking at the saving decision in terms of the consumption replacement 
ratio rather than the saving ratio and the discount rate provides a simpler way of understanding what is 
happening not only to saving but also to many other economic phenomena that, up to now, have been 
considered unrelated. 
At the time of death, which is assumed to be known, all individuals will have exhausted their 
savings. Although the model features complete certainty about the age at death, this is not an essential 
feature of the calculations.9 In addition to the cohort of active workers, I assume, to simplify 
calculations, three cohorts of retired workers (65-69, 70-84, and over 84). Following the same 
approach used for active workers, I further assume that within each of these three separate cohorts, the 
rates of dissaving are the same for all, an assumption that has only a minuscule impact on the 
numerical results and is made for ease of calculation and interpretation. For additional simplicity, I 
initially assume that Social Security and pension accounts are part of personal saving. 
Given these assumptions, the actual choice of the saving rate depends on the consumption 
replacement ratio, the interest rate, and the annual growth of labor income. Further rationality on the part 
of workers is assumed by setting the predicted growth rate of their income to be equal to its actual value 
over time. To provide a numerical example, if the initial average income of workers is 100, their desired 
consumption replacement ratio is one, their income growth is 1.8% a year, the annual interest rate on 
savings is 3%, and the workers work 45 years and retire for 15, they would plan to consume 122.5 each 
year. As a result, they would dissave for the first several decades of their work life, but during the two 
7 I placed the starting age of work at 25 so that the initial working life of 40 years would be roughly similar to that occurring 
around 2000. This meant that the L-T population estimates of the 20 to 64 cohort had to be modified accordingly. 
8 This can be seen by comparing two situations, one where both adults in the family participate in the labor force, then another 
where only one adult works outside the home. In the first case, the per capita income (and saving) is twice as high, but this 
should not influence either the percentage of income saved under the lifetime income approach followed in this model. In 
retirement, per capita consumption in the first case is twice as high, but as a percentage of lifetime income it is the same. 
9 Alternatively, the date of death is not known, but all retirees purchase an annuity from an insurance company, which knows 
exactly the average age of death and has no administrative costs. 
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decades of working, they would save enough so that their total savings (plus interest on this account) is 
sufficient tofinance an annual consumption at 122.5 during their 15 years of retirement aswell. From the 
data underlying this estimation, we can calculate that the ratio of their accumulated saving to their 
accumulated income (work income plus net interest income) during their working lifetime is 21.8%. 
The assumption that workers exhaust their savings by time of death means, of course, that they 
have no bequest motive for saving. As I argue here in more detail, this simplification may not be 
totally unrealistic in the coming decades. 
One implication of these assumptions is that the average consumption of retirees is usually 
a fraction of the consumption of current workers, unless the consumption replacement ratio is 
considerably above unity. This is because the income of those currently in the labor force is higher 
than that of retired workers when the latter were working and making their consumption and saving 
decisions. In the previous numerical example where the consumption replacement ratio is unity, 
retirees between 70 and 84 will consume only about 60% of what a current worker is consuming.'0 
Moreover, if the rate of the growth of average income increases, the average consumption of retirees 
becomes an even lower fraction of the average consumption of workers because the gap between the 
annual income during the working years becomes greater. 
There are several strings to be tied so that the entire model can be viewed as a whole. Since I am 
using the L-T population forecasts and wish consistency between these estimates and my calculations, I 
assume that between 2000 and 2050, the life expectancy annually rises by 0.1 years so that in 2050 the 
life expectancy is 85. I also assume that interest income (or borrowing costs) are transactions with an 
"external sector," which is simply a bookkeeping device to keep the financial flows balanced. Net 
income flows from this sector are not, however, very great. I further assume that in 2000, workers tart 
working at 25 and plan to retire at 65 so that they can have 15 years of retirement. Nevertheless, the 
model allows the planned retirement age to be raised as life expectancy increases. The presence of 
dependents under 25 does not appear explicitly in the model, but I show here how changes in the 
consumption replacement ratio can take changing family size into account. Technical aspects and more 
details of the simulation model, as well as other assumptions to simplify the calculations, are outlined 
in Appendix B, located at my Web site (http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/Economics/fpryorl). 
In brief, the core of the model is the annual calculation of combined saving of workers and 
dissaving of retirees, using projections of the U.S. demographic structure to derive the number of 
workers and retirees. I have not specified the institutional context of saving, for instance, whether it 
occurs through the Social Security system or through withheld business profits that are used for 
investment purposes. The hyperrationality assumption means that individuals with Social Security 
accounts or who own shares in businesses take fully into account the saving carried out in their name 
when they make their decisions about how much of their personal income they will save. After the 
basic model is presented, I relax these and a number of other restrictive assumptions, primarily by 
showing how they can be related to changes in the consumption replacement ratio. 
The Main Simulation Result 
Table 2 presents the parameters and the results of the simulation that will be used as the basis of 
comparison when the parameter values are changed. They represents the simulation results using my 
"' In actuality, per capita consumption of those over 65 is about 79% of those between 25 and 65, most likely because Social 
Security benefits have been raised in a fashion to narrow this consumption gap. My model does not take this phenomenon 
directly into account, but, as argued later, such a policy acts in a similar manner as raising the consumption replacement ratio 
because it lowers the current consumption of active workers and raises the consumption of retired workers. 
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Table 2. Initial Simulation 
Parameters Median L-T estimate 
Population growth 0.63 
Consumption replacement ratio 1.0 
Participation rate 1.0 
Interest rate 3.0% 
Annual per capital growth of labor income 1.8% 
Retirement and age of death 
2000 65 and 80 years 
2050 70 and 85 years 
Statistics on annual saving 2000 2050 
Ratio of saving of workers to total production 25.1% 22.5% 
Ratio of dissaving of retirees to total production 11.7 13.8 
Net saving (gross saving minus gross dissaving) 13.4 8.7 
Change in net saving (percentage points) -4.8% 
evaluation of the most realistic values for the various parameters. In later discussion, these are referred 
to as the "initial simulation." Several features deserve particular attention. 
The workers in this model have an impressive annual saving rate in 2000, but it is offset in part 
by considerable dissaving on the part of retirees o that net saving for the country as a whole is 13.4%. 
This is 3.8 percentage points below the preliminary value of net private domestic saving in the United 
States in 1990s.1' Part of the difference between simulated and actual results is due to the net inflows 
of foreign investment funds into the United States, which are not taken into account as private saving 
in the model and which were equal to about 1.2% of the GDP in the 1990s. Part of the remaining 
difference of 2.6 percentage points is due to saving of private businesses. As noted previously, the 
model implicitly assumes (at least in the initial discussion) that the activities of business (and Social 
Security) are completely transparent so that individuals take them fully into account when making 
their own saving decisions. This, of course, does not seem to be the case. And part of the discrepancy 
between simulated and actual saving is due to the influence of other factors not included in the model. 
Comparing these results with the previously noted estimations of Auerbach and Kotlikoff 
(1990), my estimated net saving rate of 8.7% of the GDP in 2050 shown in Table 2 is considerably 
higher than their estimate of 2.6% of the net national product (NNP; roughly 2.3% of the GDP, which 
I use as my denominator) in 2040. Their saving model of constant age-specific saving rates, however, 
does not take into account either changes in life expectancy or the retirement age. Under their 
demographic assumptions, my estimated net saving rate turns out to be roughly 5.1%. In brief, the two 
approaches toward saving behavior are very different, but the final estimated net saving rate are within 
2.8 percentage points. 
The decline in gross saving of active workers over the half century is due to the fact that 
although they still have 15 years of retirement, in 2050 they will have 45 years of working life to 
accumulate their retirement savings rather than 40 so that their annual saving rate does not need to be 
as great. The total gross saving rate of active workers minus the total gross dissaving rate 
(consumption of the retired workers) is the net saving rate and is shown in the table to fall 4.8 
' Data on total private saving come from the NIPA, table 5.1, line 2, and for net foreign investment from table 4.5, line 45. 
Private savings includes both business and personal saving, but in this model, business saving is considered part of personal 
saving carried out by businesses for their individual owners. 
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Table 3. The Ratio of Net Annual Saving to GDP Using Different Parameters 
2000 2050 Change 
(A) L-T population projections 
Low population 13.4% 5.0% -8.4% 
Medium population 13.4 8.7 -4.8 
High population 13.4 11.3 -2.0 
(B) Annual growth rates of labor income per worker 
0.9% 10.3% 4.3% -6.0% 
1.2% 11.5 6.0 -5.5 
1.5% 12.5 7.4 -5.1 
1.8% 13.4 8.7 -4.8 
2.1% 14.2 9.7 -4.5 
2.4% 14.8 10.6 -4.2 
(C) Consumption replacement ratio 
0.8 11.1% 11.4% +0.4% 
1.0 13.4 8.7 -4.8 
1.2 15.7 5.9 -9.8 
(D) Retirement age 
65 13.4% 10.5% -3.0% 
70 13.4 8.7 -4.8 
(E) Interest rate 
3% 13.4% 8.7% -4.8% 
5% 10.2 5.6 -4.6 
7% 7.4 3.1 -4.3 
Note: These results are derived from the simulation model discussed in the text and in Appendix B on my Web page 
(http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/Economics/fpryorl). All parameters are the same as in the initial simulation shown in Table 
2 except those under examination. 
percentage points over the half-century period, which amounts a decline of slightly more than a third. 
This change in the net saving rate is the key statistic of the analysis.'2 When other factors not included 
in this simple model are taken into account (see the following discussion), it may represent an upper 
limit to the fall in saving. 
These simulations generate considerable numbers, but to avoid clutter I report only three critical 
statistics for each simulation: the initial and final net saving rates and the change in the net saving 
ratio. Table 3 reports the partial equilibrium results when the major parameters are changed, while all 
other parameters of the initial simulation are held constant. 
Panel A of the table depicts the effect of population growth on the level and change in net 
saving. Since, as shown in Table 1, faster growth means a lower elderly dependency ratio, the ratio of 
retired to active workers will also be lower. As a result, the rate of aggregate dissaving by retired 
workers falls, and the decline in the net saving ratio is also less. Clearly, the fall in the saving ratio 
between 2000 and 2050 is quite sensitive to a change in the age structure of the population.13 
Panel B of Table 3 shows that a faster growth of labor income increases leads to a decreasing 
decline in the net saving rate. This comes about because, as pointed out previously, the faster the 
1 These results and some of the conclusions in later discussion are derived from a simple model presented in Appendix C on my 
Web page at http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/Economics/fpryorl. 
13 In equation Cl in Appendix C on my web page, the only expression that is affected by a change in the population growth rate 
is [(1 - a)/a], where a = the proportion of adults who are active workers. With the falling elderly dependency ratio, this 
bracket expression rises, and the saving rate increases as well, other factors remaining constant. 
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Table 4. Changes in Net Saving between 2000 and 2050 with Different Consumption Replacement 
Ratios and Changes in Other Parameter Values 
Consumption Replacement Ratios (p) 0.8 1.0 1.2 
Median population growth, annual per capita income growth = 1.8%, interest = 3% 
1. Retirement in 2050 at 70 +0.4% -4.8% -9.8% 
2. Retirement in 2050 at 65 -2.4 -3.0 -3.5 
Median population growth, annual per capita income growth = 1.8%, interest = 7% 
3. Retirement in 2050 at 70 -0.1 -4.3 -8.5 
4. Retirement in 2050 at 65 -4.6 -5.7 -6.8 
Low population growth, annual per capita income growth = 1.8%, interest = 3% 
5. Retirement in 2050 at 70 -2.6 -8.4 -14.2 
6. Retirement in 2050 at 65 -7.6 -9.3 -10.9 
High population growth, annual per capita income growth = 1.8%, interest = 3% 
7. Retirement in 2050 at 70 +2.5 -2.0 -6.5 
8. Retirement in 2050 at 65 +1.2 +1.4 +1.6 
Median population growth, annual per capita income growth = 0.9%, interest = 3% 
9. Retirement in 2050 at 70 -0.3 -6.0 -11.6 
10. Retirement in 2050 at 65 -4.8 -5.9 -6.9 
Median population growth, annual per capita income growth = 2.4%, interest = 3% 
11. Retirement in 2050 at 70 +0.6 -4.2 -8.4 
12. Retirement in 2050 at 65 -1.2 -1.6 -1.9 
growth of worker income, the smaller the ratio of a retired worker's consumption to that of an active 
worker. As a result, the higher growth rates of labor income are associated with a lower rate of 
dissaving (in relation to the current GDP) of retired workers, and therefore the net saving rate does not 
fall as rapidly.14 What is important to realize, however, is that this effect is relatively small. More 
specifically, an increase in the annual growth rate of worker income of 1.5 percentage points is 
associated with only a 1.8-percentage-point decline in the change of the net saving rate. 
Panel C of Table 3 displays the results of varying the consumption replacement ratio (p), which 
is simultaneously determined with the individual's annual saving rate and reflects the degree to which 
savers value a dollar of current and future consumption. I discuss in greater detail later (and in 
Appendix A) that its actual value is highly controversial but that it is probably between 1.0 and 1.2. In 
trying to understand the simulation results, another complication arises because in the model the 
consumption replacement ratio must be combined with other parameters of the model in the algebraic 
expression to determine the net saving rate, which means that a number of complex interaction 
effects are occurring that prevent easy interpretations. For instance, in Table 3 an increasing 
consumption replacement ratio is associated with greater net saving in 2000 but with less net saving in 
2050. For this reason, it seems most useful to focus on the change in net saving between these two end 
points with a variety of parameter values, an exercise whose results are reported in Table 4. 
Of the 36 simulation results reported in Table 4, 30 reveal a decrease in the net saving ratio by 
2050, when various consumption replacement ratios and other parameters are plugged into the 
simulation model. The exceptions occur only with a high population growth rate and a retirement rate 
14 In equation Cl in Appendix C on my Web page, z (the ratio of the income on which a retired workers based their saving to the 
income of a current worker) declines, and this, in turn, raises the aggregate saving rate. 
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.20 on Tue, 28 Apr 2015 20:16:01 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
550 Frederic L. Pryor 
at 65 or with a low consumption replacement ratio, and they suggest two counteracting mechanisms 
that are sometimes sufficiently strong to offset he general results. In the first case, a high population 
growth results in a smaller share of retired people so that total dissaving declines in comparison to 
total saving. In the second case, it is worthwhile to note that when the consumption replacement ratio 
decreases, the net saving rate decreases more slowly since the working years in which savings takes 
place is much longer than the retirement years when dissaving takes place.'5 Thus, relatively low 
consumption replacement ratios are associated with relatively higher net savings ratios, and in certain 
cases, this is enough to offset he general impact of other factors which lower the net saving between 
2000 and 2050. This effect gives rise to what might be called the "paradox of profligacy," namely, 
that low saving for future retirement is associated with a smaller decline (or even an increase) of net 
saving in the future. 
Panel D of Table 3 also shows the effects of a change in the retirement age, but more details are 
presented in Table 4. If the retirement age remains at 65 rather than rising to 70, the impact on net 
saving is quite mixed. In 10 out of 18 cases, keeping the retirement age at 65 results in a more 
favorable change in the net saving situation (e.g., less negative) than when it is raised to 70. Several 
offsetting factors are at work. On the one hand, when the retirement age remains at 65, gross saving 
increases considerably since workers must save for a much longer retirement, so this results in more 
net saving, other factors remaining constant. Moreover, the base level of consumption on which they 
base their retirement spending is lower because consumption during the working years was less 
because of higher saving. On the other hand, the relative number of retired workers is much greater 
than when the retirement age is 70. The parameters of the model determine which of these offsetting 
factors dominates the results.'6 
Finally, as shown in Panel E of Table 3, the impact of the interest rate is not strong. The 
simulation results are the result of a complex interaction of several variables because the interest rate 
has an impact on the lifetime income and the choice of a consumption level, the ratio of total average 
lifetime income to total average lifetime work income, the accumulated saving needed for retirement, 
and the ratio of consumption of retired to current workers.'7 
It is useful to investigate this matter in more detail because if the saving drought occurs, the interest 
rate is bound to rise. Table 5 presents the results of another set of simulations showing the changes in net 
saving when the change in interest rate is accompanied by changes in other parameters as well. 
The results in Table 5 are quite mixed. The table reveals four cases of the paradox of profligacy; 
otherwise, the net saving ratio decreases in all cases. In 10 out of 18 cases, a higher interest rate leads 
a more favorable change in the net saving ratio (i.e., a smaller decline). This also occurs in the 
combination of parameter values I believe most likely (reported in line 1, p = 1). Although the 
interest rate in these simulations is changed 4 percentage points, in 15 out of 18 cases the change in 
the net saving ratio is less than 2 percentage points. In brief, the results are relatively insensitive to the 
15 This can be shown by differentiating equation C2 in Appendix C on my Web page: (60/6p ) = [(1 - k)/(k - pk + p)] - p 
(1 - k) [1/(k - pk + p)]2 (1 - k), which, after rearrangement and simplification, yields (6a/6p) = [(1 - k)k]/[p(1 - k) + k]2. 
Both numerator and denominator are positive, and since k (the percentage of an adult life span spent working) lies between 
0 and 1, the numerator is positive and less than unity. so 0 < 6a/6p < 1, and saving rises more slowly than the consumption 
replacement ratio. 
16 From the equations in Appendix C on my Web page, it can be readily demonstrated that the relative values of the saving rate 
and the relative percentage of the adult life span spent working (w in the previous footnotes) determine which effect 
dominates. 
17 The response of saving to a situation where the interest rate is not constant but is rising over time is discussed here in the 
analysis of general equilibrium effects. 
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Table 5. Changes in Net Saving between 2000 and 2060 with Different Interest Rates and Changes in 
Other Parameter Values 
Consumption Replacement Ratios (p) 0.8 1.0 1.2 
Median population growth, annual per capita income growth = 1.8%, retirement age = 70 
1. Interest = 3% +0.4% -4.8% -9.9% 
2. Interest = 7% -0.1 -4.3 -8.5 
Median population growth, annual per capita income growth = 1.8%, retirement age = 65 
3. Interest = 3% -2.4 -3.0 -3.5 
4. Interest = 7% -4.6 -5.7 -6.8 
Low population growth, annual per capita income growth = 1.8%, retirement age = 70 
5. Interest = 3% -2.6 -8.4 - 14.2 
6. Interest = 7% -3.1 -8.0 - 12.9 
High population growth, annual per capita income growth = 1.8%, retirement age = 70 
7. Interest = 3% +2.5 -2.0 -6.5 
8. Interest = 7% +2.0 -1.6 -5.2 
Median population growth, annual per capita income growth = 0.9%, retirement age = 70 
9. Interest = 3% -0.3 -6.0 -11.6 
10. Interest = 7% -0.9 -5.7 - 10.6 
Median population growth, annual per capita income growth = 2.4%, retirement age = 70 
11. Interest = 3% +0.6 -4.2 -8.9 
12. Interest = 7% +0.1 -3.8 -7.6 
interest rate. If, however, the interest rate is not held constant but is changing over time, this 
conclusion may have to be modified, but before such a complication is discussed here, several 
additional factors require attention. 
4. Variations on the Theme 
Changing Some of the Rationality Assumptions 
The realism of some of the assumptions of the model can be questioned, for instance, that savers 
do not act with the rationality I have assumed.'8 For instance, individual savers do not know the future 
growth and interest rates, and, moreover, the assumption that the growth rate remains constant as the 
saving rate declines stretches credulity even more. It is, therefore, important to see what happens when 
these assumptions are relaxed. 
The consumption replacement ratio p represents not just the degree to which savers discount 
their consumption during their retirement years but also their best guesses about what economic 
growth will be. In this respect, it can be said to depend on how pessimistic or optimistic their view of 
the future is in comparison to what actually will happen. 
This part of the problem can be explored by asking what happens if the growth rate of labor 
income is actually different from what it turns out to be. Suppose that the actual growth rate is lower 
18 Some might object to the separation of the decision to retire and the decisions about saving. Nevertheless, a more exact 
modeling of a simultaneous retirement and saving decision does not yield results noticeably different from those obtained by 
blending the results of separate simulations with the different parameters. 
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than the growth foreseen by savers. Since net saving is greater when the growth rate is higher, workers 
will save more than they need to in order to meet their goals of a specified consumption replacement 
ratio. If, for instance, actual growth turns out to be 1.2% a year but the savers believe it to be 1.8% 
(and do not ever catch on to what is really happening), a quick simulation shows that the net saving 
rate does not fall 4.8 percentage points between 2000 and 2050, as predicted by the original model, 
but only 1.8 percentage points in the period. Thus, conservatism in judging changes in economic 
reality (in this case, extreme conservatism that lasts a half century) acts like an increase in the 
consumption replacement ratio and, in most cases, slows down the decline in net saving. By way of 
contrast, unrealistic pessimism about the growth rate leads to a greater fall in the net saving rate. 
We can also, of course, assume that savers are not sufficiently rational to save according to the 
lifetime income approach. One alternative savings model is that they save a constant proportion of 
their income each year. Experiments along these lines, however, show that if the replacement ratio is 
the same, the simulation results are little different.19 It is possible, of course, to abandon any saving 
function rationalized by theory and assume, in the manner of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1990), that the 
age-specific saving rates are constant, an approach that predicts even greater declines in the saving 
rate. The further we move from theory, however, the less able we are to determine the effects of 
different parameters such as the growth or interest rate on the final saving level. 
Looking at individual saving in terms of the replacement ratio also makes it possible to interpret 
changes in the annual saving rate in terms of changes in parameters of the model. For instance, many 
have argued that the recent fall in the savings rate reflects the fact that workers today have a higher 
rate of time preference and want to spend their money while it is in hand. This can be viewed as 
a decline in the consumption replacement ratio (shown by Engen, Gale, and Uccello 1999), and the 
implications of such a change can, in turn, be simulated by the model. Another interesting situation 
arises if individual savers do not take into account either the saving carried out in their name through 
withheld earnings of the corporations in which they own stock or the Social Security payouts 
promised by the government. Then such saving by corporations and government can be interpreted as 
a type of involuntary saving that can be considered an increase in the consumption replacement ratio, 
and the retirees will have more assets to liquidate during their retirement than they expected. 
In brief, various saving behaviors that deviate from the strict assumptions originally set forth can 
be taken into account in the model by interpreting them in terms of different values for the 
consumption:replacement ratio. We can loosen the assumptions of strict rationality of the model and 
still obtain useful results from the model. 
Such considerations raise anew, however, the question about the reasonable value of the 
consumption:replacement ratio to use in this kind of analysis. Considerable disagreement exists in the 
literature about what the value of p actually is or should be.20 Most analyses do not take into account 
the consumption of retirees taken in the form of transfers in kind, such as Medicare. Although the 
values chosen for the simulation reflect he range of ratios found in the literature, my own intuition is 
that the p is probably between 1.0 and 1.2 when all types of consumption are taken into account; my 
19 In major part, this similarity is due to my assumption that within the working-age population, the population in each age year 
is the same. Thus, in the lifetime income approach, the high saving rate of those approaching retirement is offset by the 
dissaving of those just entering the labor force so that overall saving for a given retirement ratio is roughly the same as the 
average saving using a Keynesian type of saving function. 
20 Three main approaches to this problem can be found in the literature. Some derive this rate using a dynamic stochastic 
optimization model, others use the advice of personal finance gurus, and still others use information derived from consumption 
budgets of consumption units headed by people of different ages. The derived rates range generally from 0.8 to 1.2. For further 
discussion of this matter, see Appendix A. 
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reasoning is discussed in greater detail in Appendix A. Although the short-term decline in the net 
saving rate in the late 1980s and 1990s suggests that p is falling, the decline in average family size and 
the rising medical expenditures of the elderly act in the opposite direction. 
Other Factors Influencing Saving: Partial Equilibrium Effects 
Investigating how certain exogenous changes might affect particular parameter values of the 
model gives additional perspective on the results. In this respect, the most important parameter is the 
consumption replacement ratio p, and it is useful, therefore, to consider how changes in other 
parameters not taken into account in the model might influence the value of p. 
Family Size 
In part, the consumption replacement ratio p reflects the number of children in a family. If 
a family has a large number of children, the parents generally have a lower personal consumption than 
in a smaller family (assuming they do not allocate a fixed amount of consumption to divide among all 
children). Their saving rate to replace a given fraction of their consumption during their working years 
for their retirement period is, therefore, lower, even while the national net saving rate in the middle of 
the 21st century is higher because these retirees are dissaving less. But there is another impact of 
a larger family size as well since more children leads to a more rapidly growing population. As 
a result, the slower decline in the long-term net saving rate arising from a lower p arising from a larger 
family size reinforces the slower decline in net saving occurring with faster population growth shown 
in panel A of Table 3 (which does not take this factor of the number of children on family saving into 
account). In brief, larger families dampen the long-term decline in the net saving rate in two respects. 
Changing Medical Needs of the Elderly 
An important part of consumption of the elderly is for medical care. According to Cutler and 
Meara (1999), medical costs are rising faster for the elderly than any other segment of the population. 
If the elderly wish to maintain other parts of consumption and to cover such rising medical costs, then 
they must raise their saving during their lifetime, which reflects a higher consumption replacement 
ratio. Of course, most of the saving for medical expenditures of the elderly is carried out through 
Medicare taxes during the working years (which lowers current consumption and raises forced 
saving), and most of the expenditures for medical purposes after retirement are drawn from the 
Medicare trust fund. But the institutional form through which such saving and expenditures is not 
important; it is the ratio of total expenditures of retired workers (including medical care) to their 
expenditures during their working years that is the key. 
Political Clout of the Elderly 
Up to now, I have assumed that Social Security payouts are based on what a worker puts into the 
system. But the current system features intergenerational transfers from the workers to the retired. 
When the elderly are able to use their political muscle to raise the Social Security payouts over and 
above what they would have received on the basis of their own contributions, the consumption 
replacement ratio increases. That is, consumption of active workers is lowered, while consumption of 
retired workers is raised. 
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Precautionary Saving 
The model assumes that there is no motive for saving to avoid running out of income in old age. 
With the increasing annuitization of income during retirement through pensions and Social Security, 
this motive of saving declines, and, in this respect, the model appears realistic, and no re- 
interpretations of the results are necessary. 
Saving for Bequests 
Up to now, I have assumed that there is no bequest motive. In recent years, some, such as 
Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus (1996), have argued that the importance of passing on an 
inheritance to others is declining. More specifically, the high U.S. divorce rate and the high mobility 
of both children and their parents (either divorced or still married) means that contact between family 
members is decreasing and the desire for leaving large sums to descendants is ebbing. Some informal 
confirmation of this assumption is provided by the sight of white-haired rivers behind the steering 
wheel of expensive cars with bumper-stickers proclaiming, "I'm spending my kids' inheritance," or 
the advice of popular advice columnists uch as Ann Landers who tell their eaders that they owe their 
children nothing after raising them and paying for their education. 
On a more analytic level, saving for bequest purposes raises some problems because the one-to- 
one relation between annual saving and the consumption replacement ratio assumed in the model 
is broken. That is, the bequest motive either raises saving during the working years or lowers 
consumption during the retirement years so that the simulation results represent only an upper limit of 
saving decline. Moreover, bequests also change the saving and consumption behavior of those 
receiving them. Of course, all these effects could be added to the model, but for analytic simplicity, I 
omit such an exercise since I wish to focus primarily on demographic effects on saving. 
A Very Brief Comment on Changes in the Labor Supply 
I noted previously that when the labor force participation rate is fixed over the entire period, its 
designated value has no impact on the results. It might be asked, however, how changing this 
participation ratio over time might affect he results. Experiments along these lines show that the net 
saving results are also not changed when the labor force participation ratio changes, at least when they 
occur in even increments over the 50-year period. Other experiments with modification of different 
parts of the model revealed nothing of interest. 
5. Some Broader Implications of the Simulation Results 
At this point, it is necessary to step beyond the confines of the partial equilibrium model, not just 
to take into account the impact of other economic actors but also to consider some general equilibrium 
effects. 
Other Sources of Saving 
Although these simulation results suggest in most cases a fall in the personal saving rate, this 
does not necessarily mean that the total saving rate will decline. Since the model focuses only on 
voluntary personal saving, it is important to take into account other types of saving in the economy 
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before generalizing about the overall saving rate. Three other sources of saving deserve attention: 
foreign capital inflows, business saving, and government saving. 
Since aging of the population is occurring in almost all industrialized countries (Bosworth and 
Burtless 1998), sooner or later they will face a declining personal saving rate in the future as well. As 
a result, they will have less capital to export, and, therefore, this does not seem a promising source for 
offsetting the fall in personal saving in the United States. Moreover, if the Euro strengthens in the 
coming decades, it may serve as an alternative safe haven for funds from the developing countries o 
that this source of capital imports into the United States will decline. 
Another source of saving is from retained profits by businesses, which are usually reinvested. 
Such decisions act, among other things, to raise the value of the company's stock. Auerbach and 
Hassett (1991) argue that because of such impacts, consumers are able to "pierce the veil of corporate 
saving" and, at least in part, to take it into account in making their personal saving decisions. If the 
substitution between these two forms of saving is not one to one, then some of this business saving 
represents a type of involuntary personal saving. As noted previously, such involuntary saving acts to 
raise the consumption replacement ratio, and, as the elderly cash in their assets to finance their 
retirement saving, their consumption will be higher. In the literature, however, I have found no 
credible argument to suggest that the rate of such business saving will change in the future. Moreover, 
if it does increase so that p rises, under most parameter values the net saving ratio will fall more in the 
future because the retirees will be spending at a higher rate. Thus, a higher rate of business saving is 
hardly the answer to the drought in personal saving. 
Similarly, involuntary personal saving might occur through the government sector as well. If it 
comes about through higher Social Security taxes, then it can be argued that individuals will pierce 
this government veil and take these forced savings into account in their voluntary saving decisions. 
Again, if the substitution is not one to one, net personal saving might fall less than it should have, and 
a higher consumption replacement ratio will result. But this has a paradoxical impact. As the 
government tries to "save" Social Security either by increasing social security taxes or by raising the 
retirement age, such measures act to raise the consumption:replacement ratio and may, in most 
situations, lead to a greater fall in net saving for the entire economy in the future so that by 2050 the 
effect should be relatively small. 
Similarly, the government can raise the current rate of saving by running budget surpluses and 
lowering the national debt. Nevertheless, temptations either to return part of this forced saving in the 
form of reduced taxes or to increase government expenditures is strong among politicians wishing to 
be reelected. 
General Equilibrium Effects 
Although business and government saving do not seem very promising offsets to the fall in 
personal saving, one credible possibility deserves attention. As the saving rate falls, the interest rate 
may rise, and asset prices would fall, which could, in turn, introduce some offsetting effects o that the 
simulation results presented so far could represent only extreme values of the actual fall in net saving. 
At this point, the analysis becomes complicated, and I can touch on only the most important 
counteracting effects. 
Saving and Interest Rates Once Again 
To the extent that higher real interest rates induce more personal saving, investment could 
increase, and economic growth could be higher. But empirical evidence (e.g., Hall 1988) suggests that 
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the impact of a change in the real interest rate on saving or consumption (i.e., the intertemporal rate of 
substitution) is small. The theoretical evidence is also not strong: In the short run, income and 
substitution effects offset each other. In the long run, the simulations carried out in Table 5 show that 
the effect of a higher interest rate on net saving is usually small, and in only half the cases does the net 
saving rate show an increase. Even though workers may make lifetime saving decisions in a different 
manner than I have modeled, it seems difficult to imagine how these would offset he demographic 
effects. 
Wealth Effects 
Any long-term rise in the interest rate would, of course, result in a fall of asset prices. A useful 
starting point is the difference between changes in net saving as measured, respectively, by flow and 
stock data (Gale and Sabelhaus 1999). By the end of the 1990s, the stock data reveal saving to be 
twice the rate of net investment. Most of this alleged saving, however, represents a capital gain 
resulting from a revaluation of assets that is reflected in a rising value of Tobin's q (Tobin and 
Sommers 2000). Obviously, a fall in saving and a rise in real interest rates can reverse this process. 
Moreover, as increasingly more people holding high-priced assets retire and cash them in to finance 
their retirement, the downward pressure on these asset prices becomes greater. This change will affect 
both personal and pension fund portfolios so that those with pension plans on a defined contribution 
basis will receive much less than they expected (and pension plans with defined benefits may face 
bankruptcy). 
Such a fall in personal wealth may well result in more saving as people scramble to replace part 
of their portfolio losses. Several offsetting effects could occur from such additional short-term saving. 
If it results in increased investment and growth, the long-term fall in saving could be reduced (Table 
3, panel B). But if it leads to Keynesian type of recession or if the fall in asset prices leads to a loss of 
investor confidence, then saving over the long term could be even further educed. Given that the 
primary focus of this analysis is demographic, further discussion and modeling of these effects must 
be left to another time and place. 
Other Offsetting Effects 
We can imagine other offsetting factors to those presented in the partial equilibrium model. Any 
rise in consumption and corresponding decline in saving and investment means that investment has 
less to fall in case of a loss of investor confidence. This means that aggregate demand shocks to the 
economy would be smaller and that, as a result, recessions would be milder. This, in turn, could result 
in a smaller decline in the long-term saving rate. 
Another possible offsetting effect could come through the government, assuming that current 
laissez-faire attitudes toward the economy persist for the next half century. But problems arise 
because many such measures could only have a short-term effect. If, for instance, saving of workers is 
encouraged in the short run, in the long run when these savers retire, they will draw down their 
savings in greater annual amount than if such measures had not been taken, which would have 
a negative impact on net saving at that time. Or if the government uses tax funds to shore up pension 
plans and banks so that private saving is safer, people might end up saving less because their 
precautionary savings needs are lower. If, by way of contrast, the government used tax funds to invest 
directly or indirectly in the economy, such offsetting effects of private saving might be reduced, and, 
because the growth rate would be higher, the decline in the saving rate would be less. Or if the 
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government allowed more immigration of young foreign workers, the decline in the elderly 
dependency ratio (and the net saving rate) could be partially offset. 
In brief, to the extent hat these or other compensating effects occur, the decline in saving will be 
less than I have indicated so that my estimates represent an overly pessimistic case for the future net 
saving ratio. While it would be interesting to theorize about this situation in greater detail, we run face 
to face into two inescapable facts. First, so many factors must be taken into account that a complex 
general equilibrium model is necessary to cover the major possibilities that lie outside my 
demographic focus. Second, any final conclusions drawn from any such more complex model would 
undoubtedly depend on parameters whose values are unknown since little relevant empirical evidence 
is at hand. 
Economic Growth: Once Again 
Up to now, I have also assumed that economic growth is exogenous, but a changing saving rate 
can have an important influence. This situation is complicated, however, because the impact of 
a falling saving rate on economic growth depends on whether technological change is exogenous to 
changes in the capital stock (i.e., disembodied). If so, then a Solow type of neoclassical growth model 
leads to the result in the short run, the per capita GDP will grow more slowly, but in the long run the 
growth rate will be the same as before.21 If, however, technological change is endogenous and, let us 
say, partially a function of previous capital accumulation (reflecting, e.g., that the new technology has 
to be embedded in new equipment), then a decline in the saving rate will lead to slower growth in both 
the short and the long run, a conclusion that seems more realistic. 
To forecast he future growth rate of the United States, we must investigate what happens to such 
key variables as the rate of technical change, the rate of depreciation, the rate of saving, and the ratio 
of capital to output. In the 1990s, gross private domestic investment and consumption of fixed capital 
(depreciation) were, respectively, 17.4% and 12.3% of the GDP. Other things being equal, if the 
private saving rate falls more than 5.1 percentage points, it will no longer cover depreciation, and the 
net capital stock would start o shrink. At this point, GDP growth could be maintained only in one or 
both of two events: if governmental saving and foreign capital inflows offset the decline of private 
saving or if technical change affecting the entire capital stock (disembodied technical change) were 
sufficiently high to offset he impact of the declining capital stock. Neither seems very likely. 
In the initial simulation, where I tried to give the most realistic values to the different parameters, 
the saving rate falls 4.8 percentage points between 2000 and 2050. Most of the other simulations 
reported in the various tables result in a fall of the saving rate between 4 and 6 percentage points. This 
suggests that capital accumulation will be much slower. Unless technical change increases 
dramatically, it therefore seems likely that economic growth will be considerably lower in 2050 
than at the beginning of the 21st century, other things being equal. The variable least likely to remain 
constant is the capital/output ratio. If this falls, each unit of investment will lead to more economic 
growth. From 1950 through 1999, this ratio fell at an annual rate of 0.12%; from 1975 through 1999, 
it fell at an annual rate of 0.34%; and in the 1990s, its annual rate of decline was considerably higher, 
presumably because of the increased investment in computing equipment. Economic events in the 
21 This counterintuitive long-term result occurs because, at greater investment, the productivity of additional units of capital 
investment declines because of diminishing returns. When the capital stock is sufficiently large, the growth induced by 
additional investment will be quite low. If saving and investment are lower, the capital stock will also be lower so that the 
impact of diminishing returns will be much less. 
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opening years of the new millennium suggest that dramatic upsurge in technological change, which is 
occurring primarily in one sector, may not last long. 
Thus, the most likely outcome of a decline in the saving rate that I have described is a decline in 
the rate of economic growth. As shown in Table 3, as the growth rate of annual income falls, the net 
saving rate also declines so that the fall in economic growth and in net saving reinforce ach other. 
Other Considerations and a Brief Summary 
For the most part, this discussion of a decline in the net saving rate in the future is detached from 
any institutional context. As such, my argument about the saving drought is much broader than the 
current discussion about crises in particular types of saving. For instance, in recent years considerable 
concern has been expressed about the future bankruptcy of the Social Security system, although 
recently some skepticism about the reality of this threat has been raised (Baker and Weisbrot 2000). 
Others, such as Schieber and Shoven (1997), provide evidence that some decades from now the 
solvency of private pension funds is also in doubt. Their argument rests on many of the same 
demographic circumstances that I have discussed here. But these two types of crises are only 
particularly manifestations of a more general decline in net saving that seems likely to occur. 
One last issue regarding Social Security also deserves mention. In their simulations of the Social 
Security system, Lee and Tuljapurkar (1998) argue that the results for 2050 are particularly sensitive 
to changes in GDP. In their particular model, they do not, however, take into account the decline in 
the national saving rate and the slowdown in the growth rate. If such considerations are factored into 
their simulations or those of others, then the future financial health of the Social Security appears even 
more precarious. 
The government faces several basic policy options to offset he deceleration in per capita growth. 
The purpose of this essay, however, is to diagnose, not to prescribe. In this era of unbounded 
optimism about future growth, it is not my intention to make pessimism once more a fashionable trait 
among economists. Nevertheless, by a model focusing primarily on the relative consumption of active 
and retired workers and the relative population size of these two groups, it should be clear that the 
personal saving rate seems likely to fall considerably over the next half century, even if my estimates 
represent an upper limit. The simulations provide some idea of the magnitudes involved under 
different assumptions. Alternative sources of saving do not seem promising, and as a result, the 
implications are unsettling: The growth of output per worker will decline, the interest rate will rise, 
and asset prices will decline. These are problems that economic policymakers need to face squarely. 
Appendix A: A Note on the Consumption Replacement Ratio 
The magnitude of the consumption replacement ratio is not known, and for this reason I use three quite different rates in 
my simulations. Most of the literature focuses only on the issue defined in terms of the decisions of individual savers and does 
not take into account the other factors outlined in the text. Three main approaches to this problem can be distinguished. 
Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999) present a sophisticated stochastic, dynamic programming model, taking into account, 
among other things, random shocks to income during the working lifetime, the time-preference rate, the interest rate, and the 
growth rate of income. They end up with a median replacement rates of 80% or 72%, depending on whether the time preference 
rates are, respectively, 0% and 3%. Comparing the results of this theoretical model to actual data of income and assets from 
several surveys, they draw a startling conclusion: Although the national saving may be low, U.S. individuals may still be saving 
at their optimal rate. Nevertheless, as Carroll (1999, p. 168) has noted, "The 'dirty little secret' of the modern dynamic stochastic 
optimization model [is that] with multiple realistic kinds of uncertainty, and with plausible assumptions about other parameters, 
the model can predict a very wide range of behavior, depending on the precise configuration of parameter values." 
A second approach looks at the popular financial iterature to see what financial gurus are advising the general public. In 
a brief review, Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999) note that most advocate saving so that the replacement of consumption is 
roughly between 65% and 85%. A third approach is to look at budgetary needs of those at different ages. Engen, Gale, and 
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Uccello (1999) point out that retired workers have no commuting expenses and lower mortgage xpenses (since these are usually 
paid off by the time of retirement). Further, their families are smaller (the number of "equivalent adults" in the family falls from 
1.68 to 1.30). On the other hand, the Consumer Expenditure Survey (U.S. Department of Labor 2000) for 1998 shows that the 
increase in average out-of-pocket medical expenses on an equivalent adult basis represents roughly 4% of consumption 
expenditures on an equivalent adult basis of a family headed by a person between 25 and 65. Moreover, in 1998, per capita in-kind 
income for the elderly through Medicare and Medicaid (U.S. Census Bureau 1999) amounted to about 35% of the consumption (on 
an equivalent adult basis) of a family headed by a person between 25 and 65. Added to the amount of saving advocated by personal 
finance experts, the true consumption needs of the retired range from 85% to 125% of those in the working ages. Gokhale, 
Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus (1996) approach the budget needs from a different angle and divide government expenditures on those at 
different ages in a more precise manner. They argue that the ratio of nonmedical expenditures of those who were 70 and 80 years 
old to those who were 30 and 40 ranged between 0.63 and 0.91 in 1987-1990, but they also point out that much of this higher 
expenditure of the elderly was due to a redistribution of income to them through the Social Security system. 
Given the lack of agreement, I have used a range of consumption replacement ratios that encompasses most of the 
estimates that are derived in these three different ways. 
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